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MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Robert A. Pascal*
PARENTAL CONSENT TO MARRIAGE CONTRACT
Louisiana Civil Code article 2330 provides that the unemancipated minor may enter into a marriage contract if
"assisted in the agreement by those persons whose consent is
necessary to his marriage." The marriage contract in question in Wilkinson v. Wilkinson' had been signed by the unemancipated bride-to-be and her mother, but not by her
father. In order to determine whether the father's assistance
was required f,-r the validity of the marriage contract, the
court considered Civil Code articles 97 and 112. The former
declares that the minor "must have received the consent of
his father and mother or of the survivor of them" in order to
contract marriage; but the latter declares that the "marriage
of minors, contracted without the consent of the father and
mother, cannot for that cause be annulled." From these two
articles the court drew the conclusion that parental consent
was not necessary to the marriage of a minor, and, having
reached this conclusion, it proceeded to declare that article
2330 permitted a minor to enter into a marriage contract
without the assistance of his or her parents.
The construction that the court placed on article 2330
would deprive it of all meaning. Thus its correctness should
be suspect. Lending support to the court of appeal's construction, nevertheless, is the fact that the French language text
of the corresponding article in the Louisiana Civil Code of
18252 reads "necessary for the validity of the marriage"
where the English reads simply "necessary to his marriage."
Yet even this latguage will not suffice to justify the court's
construction, for articles of the Civil Code must be construed
as a whole in a way which will give them meaning rather
than give them none. What article 2330 intended to say is
simply that the minor must have the assistance in a marriage
contract of those persons whose consent he is obliged to obtain for marriage, and without whose consent a marriage
license should not issue and a marriage should not be celebrated. Words of a law should not be avoided on the pretext of
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 312 So. 2d 107 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
2. La. Civ. Code (1825) art. 2310.
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following their spirit. 3 But where the apparently clear words
render the construction doubtful, as in this instance, the
4
spirit of the law is to be sought to determine its meaning.
The Louisiana Supreme Court now has overruled the
court of appeal decision in Wilkinson.5 Article 2330, nevertheless, should be amended so that its meaning will be absolutely
clear. Minors-in the opinion of the writer, even emancipated
minors-should not be allowed to enter into so important a
contract as one departing from the "legal" regime without
the assistance of more mature persons having the welfare
and interest of the minor in mind.
It is to be regretted, nevertheless, that both the court of
appeal and the supreme court opinions refer to French law asif it were the source of the Louisiana law on the subjects.
Both the Louisiana law on marriage and that on the marriage contract are most certainly Spanish rather than French
in substance and import. It is a Spanish rule, not a French
rule, that minors should have parental consent for marriage,
but that the marriage contracted without that consent may
not be declared null; and it is also Spanish law that parental
consent, nevertheless, is necessary for the validity of a marriage contract. This is true even under the present Spanish
law. 6 Had the court of appeal and the supreme court remembered that the first key to the proper understanding of the
greater portion of our present Civil Code is the Spanish system's formulations, it would have been much easier for them
to reach the correct solution in this case. Although the articles of our Civil Code often were copied from or adapted from
French language legal texts, the efforts of Louis Moreau Lis3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 13.

4. Id. art. 18.
5. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, La. Supreme Court No. 56456, decided
November 3, 1975.
6. CODIGO CML ESPAIROL (1889) arts. 45, 50, 1318 (Fisher transl. 5th ed.
1947): Art. 45. Marriage is forbidden-"(1) Any minor who has not obtained
the permission and to any adult who has not requested the advice of the
persons whose right it is to give such permission or advice in the cases
provided by law. . . ." Id. art. 50: "If, notwithstanding the prohibitions established by Article 45, any of the persons falling within its terms shall marry,
such marriage shall be valid . . . ." Id. art. 1318: "Any minor capable of
contracting marriage in accordance with law may also make an ante-nuptial
contract; but it shall be valid only when the persons designated by law to
give consent to the marriage of such minor have consented to the execution
of such contract ......
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let and James Brown in 1808 were to prepare "A Digest of the
Civil Laws Now in Force in the Territory of Orleans" which
"civil laws" were Roman-Spanish, and the efforts of Derbigny, Livingston, and Moreau in 1825 were to prepare a civil
code starting with the assumption that the Roman-Spanish
laws were being retained except where it was thought an
7
improvement could be made.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO EXPENSES OF MARRIAGE
Finley v. Finley8 demonstrates a fine appreciation for the
matrimonial regimes rules on contribution between the
spouses to the expenses of the marriage. The plaintiff, a divorced wife, sued her former husband, then remarried, for
alimony. The defendant former husband and his second wife
were separate in property by express marriage contract. In
computing the husband's ability to pay alimony, the court
correctly considered the second wife's obligation to contribute
to the expenses of her marriage, specified in article 2395 of
the Civil Code, 9 as decreasing the husband's liability for expenses of that marriage and therefore increasing the funds
from which he could be required to pay alimony to his divorced wife.
It may be well to mention here that not only the wife
separate in property is obliged to contribute to the expenses
of the marriage. Under article 2389 of the Civil Code even the
wife who enjoys the benefit of the community of gains must
contribute to the expenses of the marriage in proportion to
her income from separate property unless she has brought a
dowry.' 0 Thus the principle underlying Finley is applicable
also in alimony cases in which the defendant is a married
person enjoying the community of gains, but then under the
rule of article 2389 rather than that of article 2395.
7. See Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza,

46 TUL. L. REV. 603, 605-07, 627-28 (1972).
8. 305 So. 2d 654 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2395: "Each of the married persons separate in
property, contributes to the expenses of the marriage in the manner agreed
on by their contract; if there be no agreement on the subject, the wife
contributes to the amount of one-half of her income."
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2389: "If all the property of the wife be paraphernal, and she have reserved to herself the administration of it, she ought to
bear a proportion of the marriage charges, equal, if need be, to one half her
income."
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DAMAGES FOR HUSBAND'S INJURIES

The Third Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in West v.
Ortego"l makes very much sense in the application of the
ideas expressed in Chambers v. Chambers' 2 on the regulation
of the interests of divorced or separated spouses in the sums
recovered for personal injuries to the husband during marriage. The judiciary is bound-not by any opinion in Chambers, of course, but by articles 2334 and 2402 of the Civil
Code-to treat "actions for damages resulting from offenses
and quasi offenses suffered by the husband" during the existence of the community of gains as community assets. But,
once more, legislation must be construed and applied in a way
which is rational and just, and not so mechanically as to
ignore the good order among men which is the object of the
law. The primary responsibility for the specification of the
rules of good order lies with the legislature, but men and
their works are never infallible or perfect, and those who must
construe and apply the law must cooperate with the legislature in the completion and refinement of the legislature's
efforts. The legislature and the judiciary should be regarded
as having different functions in the process of declaring good
rules of order, rather than as having separate powers which,
because of their separateness, impede cooperation in the specification of good order.
In West the court was confronted with the problem
whether recoveries by the husband intended to compensate
him for damages which would occur to him after the divorce
of the spouses, though by reason of a delict suffered during
marriage, should be his separate property or community assets. The court decided they should be regarded as separate
assets, following some of the reasoning expressed in the many
opinions in Chambers that recognized the inequity of classifying recoveries for this kind of damage as community assets.
The writer considers the court's action in West completely
consistent with the principles discussed above, for even if
article 2334 speaks of damages occasioned by delicts suffered
during the existence of the community of gains, it may be
assumed safely that the legislator never contemplated that
the other spouse should share in monies given in compensation for suffering and loss of earnings as of a time at which
11. 309 So. 2d 883 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).

12. 259 La. 246, 249 So. 2d 896 (1971).
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the community of gains no longer existed. In such cases the
judiciary must resort to article 21 and decide according to
"natural law and reason." 13
THINGS ACQUIRED WITH SEPARATE ASSETS
De profundis clamavi, judices,14 but you have not yet
heard my cries! 15 Once upon a time, it is true, it could be said
that, under article 2402 of the Civil Code and its predecessors,
all things acquired by either spouse "by purchase, or in any
similar way" became a community asset. Indeed, it did not
matter whether the husband had made the acquisition with
separate or community funds, or whether the wife had acquired the thing with her separate funds. (At no time, of
course, did the legislation contemplate the wife's acquisition
with community funds, for under article 2404, then as now,
only the husband might disburse community funds.) Beginning quite early, our judges began to say that a thing received in exchange for a separate thing would be regarded as
a separate asset. Once this was said it was easy to declare
that a thing purchased with separate funds itself would be a
separate asset, and later, that a thing acquired in the partition of a separate thing was a separate asset. Of course, there
was always the matter of proving separate things or funds
had been given in exchange for or as the price of the purchase. Though contrary to article 2402, these ideas appear to
have been accepted by the people as fair and probably can be
said to have become custom contra legem.
Later decisions distinguished between the kinds of proof
which would be required when the husband or the wife alleged the acquisition of an immovable with separate funds.
The wife was required to prove that the price of a cash purchase had consisted of her separate funds and that she had
intended the acquisition to be a separate asset, but she or her
13. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971
Term-Matrimonial Regimes, 32 LA. L. REV. 219-23 (1972).
14. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969
Term-Matrimonial Regimes, 30 LA. L. REV. 219, 223-25 (1969); The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Matrimonial Regimes, 26 LA. L. REV. 477-80 (1966).
15. See Primeaux v. Liberstat, 307 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975);
Succession of Broussard, 306 So. 2d 399 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Stevens v.
Claiborne Co., 305 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Succession of Miangolarra, 297 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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heirs could make this proof at any time by any probative
evidence. If the wife had made a credit purchase, however,
she was required to prove (1) that she administered her
paraphernalia and retained its revenues, (2) that her prospective revenues were sufficient to discharge the obligation contracted by her, (3) that she had intended the thing purchased
to be her separate asset, and (4) that the funds finally used to
pay the credit portion of the price had been her separate
funds. The husband fared less well. He came to be presumed
conclusively to have acquired an immovable as a community
asset unless he included two declarations in the act of acquisition, (1) that he was purchasing with separate funds and (2)
that he intended the thing purchased to be a separate asset,
and later he was required to prove (3) that he had in fact used
separate funds to make the acquisition. These forms of proof
were completely outside and beyond the law, for even if the
custom contra legem allowing the acquisition of separate
things with separate assets was to be deemed to have the
force of law, proof of any kind suffices in the absence of
legislation requiring proof of a specific kind.
Whatever the merits or demerits of this judicially initiated scheme of things, however, it was all repealed by implication by an amendment to article 2334 in 1912.16 Under
that amendment all things acquired with separate funds are
separate things. There is no other criterion to be applied
when a spouse has purchased with his or her separate funds.
(Again, only the husband can purchase with community
funds.) There is no requirement of proof that the spouse intended the acquisition to be a separate asset. If the community has been dissolved at the time the proof is to be made,
then the presumption that all assets possessed by either
spouse at its termination are community assets must be rebutted by proof to the contrary. If the community has not
been dissolved, there is no presumption either way, and proof
must be by a preponderance of evidence. 17 But, again, the
legislation not requiring any particular mode of proof in
either case, any probative evidence must suffice.
Such is the law under the legislation. The numerous suits,
year after year contesting the decisions to the contrary, at16. La. Acts 1912, No. 170.
17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2405, establishing the presumption in favor of the
community character of assets on hand at "the dissolution of the marriage,"
by its words indicates that the presumption does not apply before dissolution.
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test to the non-acceptance of the content of these decisions as
custom. How long, then, must the people wait for the
judiciary to apply the legislation?
RETIREMENT PLAN BENEFITS
Employers give salaries and fringe benefits as remuneration for services, not as gratuities. Hence it must be said that
an employee's interest in a pension plan, even one theoretically financed entirely by employer contributions, is something produced by the labor or industry of an employee
spouse and therefore a community asset under article 2402 of
the Civil Code. That characterization, however, runs counter
to the very purpose of the plan, to provide for the employee at
a future time. Modern legislatures are inclined to consider all
such interests the separate assets of the employee spouse,
though the proceeds paid to the employee in retirement may
be deemed a community asset of the marriage in existence at
that time. I8 In Louisiana, the Teachers Retirement System
legislation makes the interests under the system the separate
asset of the earning teacher at all times. 19 But where there is
no such special legislation, Louisiana retirement plans certainly seem to come under the general rule of article 2402.20
Yet some retirement binefits are very much like life insurance proceeds and there is the temptation to treat them in
the same way. This is the result which was reached in T. L.
21
James & Co. v. Montgomery.
Pension and retirement plans, having as their objects the
protection of persons in their unproductive years and the
protection of their dependents in the event of the employee's
early death, do not fit very well under the normal rules of the
community of gains. Once more the writer calls for more
adequate legislation on this and the related subject of insurance for family members and other dependents, permitting
the costs of such plans to be taken from community funds
without any obligation to reimburse the other spouse, treat18. See, e.g., QUEBEC CIV. CODE art. 1266(e), subsection 5, as amended by
1969 Eliz. II, ch. 77, s. 27.
19. This matter was discussed in the last term in Teachers' Retirement
System v. Vial, 304 So. 2d 53 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
20. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1974
Term-Matrimonial Regimes, 35 LA. L. REV. 303, 308-09 (1975).
21. 308 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 1st Cir.), affd, No. 56, 138 (La. Dec. 12, 1975),
reh. granted No. 56, 138 (La. Jan. 16, 1976).
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ing retirement payments as assets of the community regime
in existence at the time of their receipt, and assimilating all
22
death benefits to life insurance proceeds.
22. See Pascal, Updating Louisiana's Community of Gains, 49 TUL. L.
REV. 555, 574 (1975).

